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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
v. 
JACK JAMES TRANE : Case No. 20010068-SC 
Defendant/Petitioner : Priority No. 13 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's efforts to interpret the interfering statute, both the State and 
the Court of Appeals misconstrue that provision and invent a test without any textual 
support. Instead, the State requests this Court to adopt the State's view of what it wants 
the law to be. This Court lacks authority to rewrite statutes in this manner. Both the 
plain language and the legislative history of the interfering statute unambiguously 
manifest that persons can only be arrested for resisting Ma lawful arrest or detention." 
Here, the police lacked lawful grounds to search Mr. Trane based on reasonable safety 
concerns or incident to a valid arrest. Because the police exploited Mr. Trane's 
constitutional rights in searching him, the exclusionary rule required the trial judge and 
the Court of Appeals to suppress the fruits of the illegal police conduct. 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE INTERFERING STATUTE 
ESTABLISH THAT MR. TRANE COMMITTED NO 
CRIME 
The State's interpretation of the interfering statute has no foundation in the plain 
language or legislative history of that law. As this Court mandated in State v. Gardiner, 
814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991), the Court of Appeals was required to apply "the specific 
code section[]M in question. As applied here, the interfering statute only establishes 
criminal liability when a person "has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care 
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or 
detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by . . . 
refusing] to perform any act required by lawful order." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2) 
(1999). That statute plainly provides that a person commits a crime when that person: (1) 
knows or should know that the police are "seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention;" 
and, then (2) disregards a "lawful order." IdL Thus, absent "a legal conclusion that the 
arresting officer acted with authority and probable cause," no crime exists. 
Commonwealth v. Biagini. 655 A.2d 492, 497 (Pa. 1995). 
Contrary to the State's claims, the legislative history fully supports this 
conclusion. The legislature amended the interfering statute in the wake of this Court's 
decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). Although a majority found the 
former interfering statute to be unconstitutionally vague, this Court's chief complaint 
centered on arresting innocent persons "without probable cause." Id. at 801. A two-
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judge plurality faulted the statute for potentially "penalizing] a law-abiding citizen by 
incarceration because he [or she] did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest. . . in 
violation of both [search and seizure clauses under] the Utah and United States 
Constitutions." Id A concurring justice agreed that because the former interfering 
statute could be interpreted as "both permitting] and encouraging] an unreasonable-and 
I think unconstitutional-arrest," he found the statute to be both vague and violative of the 
Fourth Amendment. IcL 803, 805. 
The legislature responded to Bradshaw in 1981 by establishing a crime when a 
person "has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, 
that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself [or herself] 
or another and interferes with such arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any 
weapon." Act Relating to the Misdemeanor of Interfering with a Law Enforcement 
Officer Making a Lawful Arrest, ch. 62, § 1, 1981 Utah Laws 351 (codified as Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1981)). In 1990, the legislature again amended the 
interfering statute by adding to the use of force or a weapon two additional forms of 
interfering with a "lawful arrest:" 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has 
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes 
with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
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(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act 
required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to 
refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest 
or detention. 
Act Relating to Criminal Law; Amending the Offense of Interfering with an Arresting 
Officer, ch. 274, §1, 1990 Utah Laws 1273 (codified as Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305). 
These amendments are wholly consistent with the plain language of the interfering 
statute and this Court's explicit concern in Bradshaw for the police wrongfully arresting 
"law-abiding citizen[s]." 541 P.2d at 801. The 1981 amendment only allowed for a 
crime when a person knew or should know that the police were seeking to effect a 
"lawful arrest or detention." This change was in direct response to this Court's perceived 
constitutional doubts about the interfering statute. Likewise, when the legislature added 
subsection 2 to the statute in 1990, it limited arrests to refusals to follow "lawful" police 
orders. The legislature obviously learned the lessons taught in Bradshaw and restricted 
crimes under that subsection to interference with lawful police conduct. 
The legislative debates on these amendments make this conclusion explicit. 
Courts give "controlling effect" to legislative statements "when they are consistent with 
the statutory language and other legislative history." Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 
4 
253, 2/63 (1986) Consistei it with the pi.*« tnguage and history of the ,wi<\ h wws 
or detentions based on "reasonable grounds oi . . . probable cause." floor Debate, 42nd 
Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (January 19, 1981) (House Recording no. ?. side \ i (statement by 
bill sponsor Rep Or\ al C, I larrisoi l). Moreover, the i>. . \>as dratted by a states HU 
constitutional scrutin). IcL Obviously, the legislature's chief concern was to ensure that 
the statute was limited to interfering with constitutionally-based police conduct. 
.•. The amendi i lent adding subsection tw o ii i 19 90 i ef lects sii nilar concerns. In 
desi, ihiiH1 I he pmpu nil I Il In," si ah1 St'iuli ll ite bill s spoi ISOI stated tl lat si ibsecti :: i 11 '• ; 
applied to refusals "to perform an act required by lawful order of a peace officer making 
a law ful arrest which is neeessarx lo effect the arrest, oi (2) to refrain from performing 
any. - ^ ting officer niuiuih ^ . . ^ 
(Januarx i!i *-- .• * kivordinr No suit '\ ;<--atement bv Sen vn-phaMS 
added).1 This repeated emphasis on lawful police conduct is lully eoiL^ient with tik 
plain language and legislative history. 
City \ .J'enarriyres, 2000 UI App J 2 J , 14 r.Jd (/AS. I- repeatedly quoting UK, 
!The debate in the House of Representatives did not meaningfully address 
subsection two 
:" 
interfering statute's reference to the police '"seeking to effect"1 a lawful arrest or 
detention. State's Brief at 14, 17-19, 26, 31 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305) 
(1999)). According to the State, the quoted language plainly supports protecting the 
police whenever they act "' within the scope of [their] authority and the detention or 
arrest has the indicia of being lawful.'" State's Brief at 16 (quoting Pena-Flores, 2000 
UTApp 323,Till, 14P.3d698). 
Both the State and the Court of Appeals misconstrue the text of the interfering 
statute. The phrase "seeking to effect to a lawful arrest or detention" does not apply to 
police officers' subjective intent as the State argues; rather, it refers to the defendant's 
understanding. Specifically, the interfering statute only imposes criminal liability when 
the defendant "has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-305) (1999). 
Thus, the interfering statute focuses on citizens' understanding when confronted 
by the police. The 1981 legislative debates agree. One legislator expressed concern that 
the police could arrest citizens for resisting an arrest even though they did not know the 
person detaining them was a peace officer. Floor Debate, 42nd Utah Leg., Gen, Sess. 
(January 19, 1981) (House Recording no. 3, side A) (statement by Rep. Hilliard). The 
bill's sponsor responded that "the bill expressly requires that the person who is charged 
with the offense of resisting a lawful arrest must have knowledge that the person is a 
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polk, uiiitci wi UY. iii the exercise oi reasonable care v riiormation 
Rep. Orval Harrison). Ilius, the statute reoiire^ persons to ki lowingly resist ai i 
objectively "lawful11 arrest. This approach is consistent with established Fourtl 1 
Amendment law under which a police officer's subjeLii •. \K iiv.»^  *n detaining suspects 
927 I\2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. AW,. . -/,;.). 
The State appears to tacitly concede that its analysis is ilot based on the plain 
language of the interfering statute by its extei isive reliance on case law that interprets 
State cites, including the Utah ones, interpreted the text of the interfering statute. 
The State's cases also have no application here because the police in each of those 
: .i . . ... . .;iv \. Mate, r , ? i _. 1 
14 (Ala* \; M (arrestee* ku u^aun un and fleeim • . -* j , ^ 
Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36-37 (t'al, 1969) (assaulting police), disapproved oi I other grounds 
People v. Gonzales. 800 I\2c! I I5<>. 1222-23 (Cal. 1990); Kessler v. Barowskv . 0?1 P ^ 
Ci. s pp 1982) (valid warrant); State v. Laughlin. 933 P.2d 813, 813-14 (Mont. 1 , J,} 
(force and valid warrant); Fugere v. State, Taxation and Revenue Dep'U Motor Vehicle 
Di\.» > i •. :4 .• niMits ca.se in\ ol\ ii ig \ alid ai rest for 
; 
DUI); State v. Castle, 616 P.2d 510, 511-12 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (use offeree and 
speeding); State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 574-75 (Utah 1991) (assault on peace 
officer); Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1010-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (valid 
warrant); State v. Griego. 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (arrest based on 
disorderly conduct); State v. Mather, 626 P.2d 44, 45-46 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (valid 
warrant and speeding). The Court of Appeals similarly overlooked this distinction in 
Pena-Flores. 2000 UT App 323,1fl3, 14 P.3d 698. 
Instead of applying the plain language of the interfering statute, the State 
repeatedly seeks to promote the policy that unlawful arrests should be contested in court, 
not "in the street" because modern criminal procedures exist to remedy an unlawful 
arrest. State's Brief at 18, 25-26, 33. Regardless of any policy arguments, this Court 
does not substitute its judgment in place of the legislature's. As this Court has ruled 
regarding criminal offenses, f"[i]t is the power and responsibility of the Legislature to 
enact laws to promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of society . . . 
and this Court will not substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature with respect to 
what best serves the public interest.'" State v. Herrera 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983)). 
When confronted with identical policy arguments from prosecutors, the Virginia 
Court of Appeals ruled that it is the legislature's "'province'" to make such 
determinations. Hill v. Commonwealth. 553 S.E.2d 529, 532 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) 
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(quoting Bruce Farms. Inc. v. Coupe, 24 ; " S E 2d - UK) 1 04 (V : i 1978)) I hat coi irt 
right to passively resist an unlawful arrest. .ikewise, Utah's legislature must 
determine the policies behind resisting the police. 
Contrary to the l our; • .... decision below and in Pcna-Hores , nowhih :" 
tilt1 pl.iin laiteuaij'i1 nil Ihr l i i l r i I n mi ' \t,i!lii!h uliill ll'lir li I ' l ' l i l im 1 IIIIIIK HI HI oil lln ,,i npi t 
[police] authority " or an "indicia of being lawful." 2001 U i App 323, Tjl 1, 14 P.3d 698. 
Rather, the legislature decided in that statute only to criminalize interference w ith 
"lawful" police ...,..;...* ,;,. - , r : ;mist respect tiuii p*MiL> determination. 
ii. ' 11 i i": vo i. i c: i«: LACKED m VR i ICUL ABLE 
SUSI '1CION T O S E A R C H ]\ Ill 1 R ANE AND I HE 
STATE FAILED T O ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAlJSE 
FOR AN ARREST BASED ON INTOXICATION 
1 he police searcl it and ai i est :)l:: I" « Ii I i ai :te b zl x • v < ' a s i u lla ' Ill ill Of f i z zi 
Dobrowolski iadwd reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr. 1 lane was armed and 
presently dangerous. Moreover, because Mr. Tranc \\a^ no! a danger to himself oi to 
others, I - ....i not com..! i lit. til. le crii tie of ii ltoxicatio. puiK.. ^.mpu KICKC^ 
coi istiti itional gi c I it ids to seai cl I I\ It I t ait i, :;:: 
As a. threshold matter, the State requests this Com t to Iii nit its rev iew oi tl ic 
reasonableness of the search to the suppression hearing because the preliminary hearing 
t , .x,. r | U L - ! 
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Specifically, it claims that this Court cannot consider Officer Dobrowolski's admission 
that he searched Mr. Trane out of ,fa measure of precaution [rather] actual suspicion." R. 
165: 13. The State overlooks that defense counsel specifically highlighted in his motion 
to suppress that "at the preliminary hearing, Officer Dobrowolski testified that he had no 
reason to suspect that Mr. Trane was armed or dangerous and that the search was merely 
a preventative measure, not one based on reasonable suspicion." R. 45, 47. Thus, this 
fact was properly before the hearing judge. 
In any event, the State's cases do not bar appellate courts from relying on 
preliminary hearing transcripts. In fact, numerous courts hold that "[t]he entire record is 
considered on appeal" whenever reviewing the denial of motions to suppress. United 
States v. Muniz. 1 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir.), cert, denied 510 U.S. 1002 (1993); see 
United States v. Martin, 982 P.2d 1236, 1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basev, 
816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Kong. 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1994); People v. Dennison. 378 N.E.2d 220, 223 (111. App. Ct. 1978); State v. Young . 
576 So. 2d 1048, 1054 n.l (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan . 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Despite the State's assertions, these cases in no way limit appellate 
review of suppression motions. They simply happened to arise in the context of 
affirming the denial of such motions. 
Even more to the point, at least one court has explicitly ruled that "[t]he entire 
record, including the transcripts of a preliminary hearing where a different judge 
10 
presided, may be coiiMdacv; upon review to determine WIICUK .H: IN ;KLT ^ arrest md 
\ • 'r Ct. J V81). 1 vvo justices of this Com t have agreed with tllis view. See_also Stale \ 
Asche, 745 P.2d 1255, 1273-74 & n.9 (I Jtali 1987) (dissent relying on preliminary 
hearing transcript in reviewing motion to suppress) (i )m ham, I KL Zimmerman, J , 
dissentii ig) ••• •• •• - - • ' 
The State's remaining cases similarly do not support its position. Rather; tvvo 
stand for the unremarkable proposition that if additional evidence on the constitutionality 
< >ii laces loiiowing a suppressioi i hearing; the cl lallenger must renew the 
motion ..-M . •' * « P«LV .^ 
States v. Hicks. 978 F.2d 722, 724 (D.C. LII. 1993); Aiken v. State , 647 A.2d 1229, 
1232 (Md. Spec. App. 1994). The State's other cases do not e\eu address the issue of 
using prelirnmai) nearmg transc:, . nae/. \. .>UIK. : >s . „ . , v . r^\ * u-. \ \, ,v 
199?Hrciu--a- - v. ..MI U ^ • - - : • \W. \ M -'fie- • -•• . . "i • 
State v. Ryder, 3 : c \ W.2d 786, 788-89 (Iowa 1982; ^uniting re\ iew k> motion because 
appellant failed to produce suppression hearing transcript); Commonwealth v. Powers , 
Regardless, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing establishes tllat 
Officer Dobrowolski lacked a reasonable, suspicion that Mr, Itaiic was "armed and 
presently dangerous." I erry v. Ohio, uinutted that 
appeared to be cooperating with Officer Bushman when he arrived. R. 166: 48-50. He 
conceded further that he based his decision to search only on (1) the ambiguous dispatch 
report; (2) Mr. Trane's intoxication; and (3) Officer Bushman's vague statement that Mr. 
Trane "was trying to talk himself into jail." R. 166: 48-49. The State has identified no 
specific circumstance to even suggest that Mr. Trane was armed or dangerous. It even 
admits on appeal that Mr. Trane made no threats or took any aggressive actions. State's 
Brief at 13. 
The State also fails to dispute that Officer Dobrowolski could have made 
"reasonable inquiries" before searching Mr. Trane. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Instead, the 
State claims Officer Dobrowolski reasonably feared for his safety based on his general 
experience with intoxicated people. State's Brief at 12-13. This argument essentially 
asserts that the police can search anyone who is drunk. Contrary to the State's 
intimations, the police lack authority to search persons absent "particularized suspicion." 
Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
Similarly, the State failed to establish probable cause to search Mr. Trane incident 
to an arrest for intoxication. The State mischaracterizes the opening brief when it claims 
that Mr. Trane failed to marshal the evidence. State's Brief at 36. Rather, the meager 
evidence simply failed to support intoxication. Because the police confronted Mr. Trane 
in a public parking lot, he could have only violated the intoxication statute if he 
"endangered] himself or another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (1999). The State 
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argues that Mr. Trane's swaying and loud demeanor coupled with Officer Dobrowolski's 
generalized concern that intoxicated persons can pose safety risks established probable 
cause. State's Brief at 37. The State fails to explain how these facts even suggest that 
Mr. Trane posed a danger to anyone. Officer Dobrowolski admitted at the preliminary 
hearing that he merely conducted a 'Terry search11 and that Mr. Trane posed no safety 
risk. R. 165: 13-15. At the suppression hearing, he failed to identify any specific 
reasons to establish that Mr. Trane's intoxication posed a safety risk. Instead, he simply 
recited his general concerns about drunk persons. R. 166: 32-33. Moreover, Officer 
Bushman explicitly testified at the suppressiori hearing that Mr. Trane created no risk to 
himself or anyone else. R. 166: 22. Again, the State's arguments seem to rest largely on 
its unfounded notion that the police can arrest anyone who is intoxicated. The police had 
no lawful grounds to search Mr. Trane. 
ffl. THE PENA-FLORES TEST VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO 
BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES 
Regardless of the lawfulness of the search, the Court of Appeals' decision in 
Pena-Flores unconstitutionally protects the police at the expense of fundamental 
individual rights. As opposed to shielding the police, the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures protects citizens from unlawful police conduct. But, 
under the Pena-Flores test, the police enjoy almost absolute immunity and are 
13 
encouraged to violate individual rights. The interfering statute and this Court's decision 
in Gardiner combine to form the proper balance between public safety and individual 
liberties. 
According to the Court of Appeals below, Pena-Flores held that the police may 
unlawfully arrest persons whenever they use their "marked police cruisers [while] 
wearing clearly marked uniforms . . . [and they are] investigating a report" of a possible 
crime. State v. Trane, 2001 UT App 360 at 2. This broad approach appears to extend 
protection to virtually all official police encounters. It further sanctions official 
misconduct and encourages the police to arrest a person "even though the individual 
committed no crime prior to being provoked by the police." Craig Hemmens & Daniel 
Levin, "Not a Law At All:" A Call For A Return To the Common Law Right to Resist 
Unlawful Arrest, 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1999): see also State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 
689 (Utah 1990). These concerns are becoming increasingly pronounced as more police 
officers engage in community-oriented policing, thereby multiplying their encounters 
with citizens. Hemmens & Levin, 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. at 43. 
The Court of Appeals failed in its attempt to restrict this near-blanket protection. 
That Court provided no explanation for how the "indicia of lawfulness" prong deters 
"illegal activities such as racial profiling and abuses of police authority." 2001 UT App. 
360 at 3 n.2. It is further unclear why that prong bars such police abuses but does not 
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
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Pena-Flores provides no meaningful parameters for protecting individuals from police 
misconduct committed under the guise of official authority. 
Allowing for citizens to non-violently resist unlawful searches and seizures does 
not encourage violence or brawls in the streets as the State would have this Court 
believe. State's Brief at 30-32. The interfering statute bars the use of force or a weapon 
in resisting a lawful arrest. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(1) (1999). Further, in Gardiner , 
this Court ruled that citizens have no right to attack a police officer making an unlawful 
arrest and may be convicted of assault for doing so. 814 P.2d at 575. The State's 
concerns for violence are unfounded. On the other hand, passive resistence strikes the 
appropriate balance between protecting the police and guaranteeing the right to control 
one's person. State v. Wilkerson. 755 P.2d 471 (Idaho Ct. App.), affd 766 P.2d 1238 
(Idaho 1988). Brushing off an illegal arrest as a matter for the courts to sort out makes a 
mockery of the significant indignity and disruption an arrest and incarceration cause. 
Hemmens & Levin, Sw. U. L. Rev. at 45-46. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court made the distinction between passive resistence 
and actual violence in Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492, 497 (Pa. 1995). That 
state's interfering statute similarly bans preventing a "lawful" arrest. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
5104. Just like Pennsylvania law, Mr. Trane committed no crime and he was illegally 
searched because he only passively resisted the police officers' attempts to search him. 
Commonwealth v. Wertelet, 696 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. 1997). To deter the police 
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from committing "future illegalities," this Court should exclude the fruits of Mr. Trane's 
unlawful arrest. State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the plain language of the interfering statute, this Court should reverse 
Mr. Trane's conviction. The need to deter police misconduct and to protect individual 
rights demands reversal. 
SUBMITTED this /JU day of March, 2002. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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